Maryland Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 4

Article 5

On the Topology of Uniform Environmental
Standards in a Federal System - and Why it Matters
James E. Krier

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
Recommended Citation
J. E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System - and Why it Matters, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1226 (1995)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/5

This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

ON THE TOPOLOGY OF UNIFORM ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM-AND WHY IT
MATTERS
JAMES

E.

KRIER*

A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen.
**
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
Uniform standards are much favored among the makers of federal environmental policy in the United States, which is to say, among
the members of Congress. By and large-judging at least from the
legislation it has enacted-Congress expects the air and water eventually to meet the same minimum levels of quality in every state in the
country, and expects each pollution source in any industrial category
or subcategory to be controlled just as much as every other such
source, notwithstanding the source's location or other peculiar characteristics. There are exceptions to these generalizations, but they are
exceptions and not the rule.1 Since 1970, environmental policy in the
United States increasingly has been federal (meaning that standards
and controls are, for the most part, imposed by the national government, although they generally are implemented at the state and local
levels). And, nominally at least, the federal policy has been one of
uniform standards and controls in the sense suggested above. The
standards have been set in ways essentially indifferent to territorial
and, to some considerable degree, source variation.
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Susan G. Muller for her assistance on this Article.
**

RALPH W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in EssAYs: FIRST AND SECOND SERIES 29, 35 (1990).
1. The federal Clean Air Act, for example, prescribes uniform minimum air quality
standards for all parts of the country, and uniform control standards for various categories

of stationary sources. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988) [hereinafter
CAA] (ambient air quality standards); CAA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (new source emission standards); see also the Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301, 306, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1316 (1988) [hereinafter FWPCA] (source effluent limitations); FWPCA § 510, 33
U.S.C. § 1370 (allowing states to set more demanding, but not less demanding, standards);
ROBERT V.

PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:

LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY

118

(1992) ("The principal federal pollution control schemes.., required EPA to establish
uniform national standards that can be implemented and administered by states subject to
federal supervision. Most federal environmental statutes specify that the standards they
require are minimum standards that must be met by every state, while expressly authorizing states to establish more stringent pollution controls if they desire.").
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In thinking about federal uniform environmental standards, I
shall focus for the most part on the pollution problem, to the exclusion of other environmental problems having to do with such concerns as vanishing species, land reclamation, or the regulation of toxic
waste sites. Air and water pollution controls are my general subject,
and air pollution controls my chief case in point. This is partly a matter of convenience, a way to get to the bottom of some fundamental
considerations that display themselves in superficially disparate ways
across the vast reaches of federal environmental legislation. Mostly,
though, my focus reflects the reality that federal pollution policy, and
air pollution policy in particular, is especially plagued by the vices of
uniformity. In any event, what I have to say about the case of pollution policy can be applied to other environmental policies to the extent (probably considerable) that the arguments in the one case fit
the situations in the other cases.
I narrow my focus-though again not its bearing-in another way
as well. The discussion thus far has alluded to two different kinds of
pollution standards: (1) ambient quality standards that limit the
amount of pollution permitted in any state's air or water, and (2)
emission or effluent standards that in one way or another limit the
amount of pollution that can come from sources in any state (cars,
factories, power plants, and the like). Both types of standards are
aimed at controlling pollution, but there is nevertheless a difference
between them that impels me to be concerned, here, primarily with
the first category, ambient quality standards. My topic is environmental policy in a federal system, and it is with its ambient controls that
the federal government specifies the obligations of the various states
with respect to water or air quality. Ambient standards dictate, at a
minimum, how clean the environmental media (in this case water,
and particularly, air) in a given area must be. Any area may choose to
clean up more if it wishes.2 In short, ambient standards directly limit
what the states, not pollution sources, are free to do. Hence they are
the immediately interesting subject from the standpoint of
3
federalism.

2. See James E. Krier, The IrrationalNational Air Quality Standards: Macro- and MicroMistakes, 22 UCLA L. REv. 323 n.2 (1974).
3. Indirectly, of course, ambient standards have the effect of controlling sources as
well, because states must regulate sources to the degree necessary to achieve the federally
mandated ambient standards. Beyond this, federal air and water pollution legislation also
sets its own independent standards for large numbers of pollution sources, see supranote 1,
but the states must impose stricter controls on these sources, if necessary, to achieve the
required ambient quality.
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THE VICES AND VIRTUES OF UNIFORM STANDARDS

Consider first what might be bad about the federal government
setting uniform ambient standards of, for example, air quality for
every state in the union, and then what might be good about it.
A.

Vices

On this topic, I have earlier written at some length (and I do not
think any differently today), so what follows is merely a summary.
Anyone who is skeptical or otherwise interested can consult the original item.4
The chief problem with uniform ambient standards is that the
territory upon which they are imposed is itself not uniform, but
rather, variable in a number of relevant respects. The harm that pollution causes, and the difficulty of limiting that harm, are functions of,
among other things, natural resource endowments, degrees of development, human attitudes, and the size and nature of the population
of any particular area. Assuming that these characteristics are not distributed with even rough uniformity across the country-an obviously
correct assumption-it follows that the implications of achieving any
given level of environmental quality will not be uniform either. In
particular, the costs of pollution and pollution control will differ significantly from place to place.
Consider first the costs of pollution, and the contentious example
of health costs, which vary in several respects as a function of population. Suppose the existence of two states, SI and S2, both of which are
mandated to have ambient air quality of the level Q Level Q is relatively safe but not perfect because some especially vulnerable or sensitive people exposed to it would suffer ill effects.' Suppose, in
addition, that S1 has a small and generally robust population, whereas
S2 has a large and somewhat less vigorous one (assume, for example,
that we are talking about Alaska and New Jersey). Negative health
effects-health costs-obviously will be larger in S2 than in SI, not

4. See Krier, supra note 2, at 324-30 (arguing that "uniform national ambient standards
represent a fundamental error" in the approach to air quality regulation).
5. The general view today is that there is no perfectly safe level of, say, air pollution,
except a zero level. That is, there is no threshold--even a small amount of pollution is
likely to lead to some negative health effects. See George Eads, The Confusion of GoaLs and
Instruments: The Explicit Considerationof Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
in To BREATH FRELY 222, 228 (Mary Gibson ed., 1985).
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only per capita (because 52's population is more vulnerable) but also
in total (because 52's population is larger).6
For a less contentious example of the same general point, consider how the aesthetic costs of pollution blight will vary with the territory. For example, one reason people value beautiful mountain areas
is for the wonders of the vista. Smog that obscures a magnificent view,
and shrouds a noble symbol, is an especially undesirable thing. However, some places in the country are not beautiful-in fact they are
ugly-and hiding them (all other things equal) could be a kind of
blessing. In any event, most of us would consider it odd for someone
to suggest working as hard, and purely for the sake of beauty, to keep
Newark's atmosphere as utterly pristine as the mountain air of the
Rockies. It would be odd, that is, unless it happened to cost nothing
to make the air perfectly clean anywhere, in which case any resulting
benefit, however minuscule, would be worthwhile.
The fact, of course, is that it does cost something (actually a lot)
to clean the environment; if it did not, we would not have pollution
problems. And just as the pollution costs of a given level of environmental quality differ from place to place, so too do the costs of pollution control. The meteorology and topography of an area, the size
and distribution of its population, the size and distribution and nature
of its industrial base-all of these and other factors affect the costs of
controlling pollution.7
6. The example is contentious for a variety of reasons, one of them being the matter
of talking about health in terms of "costs"-of which more later-and another being the
matter of aggregating individual health effects to arrive at a "total cost" for the population
in question. One might call this kind of aggregation a utilitarian approach, as contrasted
to looking only at individual (per capita) health effects, a Kantian approach. Federal legis-

lation is ambiguous on this matter. Air quality standards are supposed to protect the individual (indeed, the vulnerable individual).

See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988) (declaring

protection of public health and welfare as the goal underlying national primary ambient
air quality standards); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS
§ 4.06 (1981) (noting that legislative history indicates a congressional intent to protect
even "particularly sensitive citizens, such as bronchial asthmatics") (quoting S. REP. No.

1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970)). Yet statistical data regarding the health costs of air
pollution routinely measure aggregates.
7. See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw & Paul R. Pormey, EnvironmentalPolicy in the United States, in
POLICY TowARDs THE ENVIRONMENT 289, 311 (Dieter Helm ed., 1991) ("[T]he

ECONOMIC

benefits and costs of pollution control may vary with geography, so that uniform (minimum) air-quality standards such as would be enforced under the Clean Air Act may not be
appropriate from a cost-benefit perspective. For instance, our research has found that the
economically efficient standard for total suspended particulates for Baltimore-the concentration at which marginal benefits are equalized with marginal costs-is nearly 50 per
cent greater than the optimal standard for St. Louis."); AlanJ. Krupnick & Paul R. Portney,
Controlling Urban Air Pollution: A Benefit-Cost Assessment, 252 SCIENCE 522, 526 (1991) ("Be-

cause the benefits and costs of air pollution control are sure to vary considerably among
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Because uniform ambient quality standards neglect the rich variegation on the ground, to impose them is necessarily to make some
places too clean while leaving others too polluted-unless, of course,
Q is very stringent, in which event some places simply will be too
clean. For them, achieving Q will entail control costs larger than the
pollution costs avoided.'
B.

Virtues

The foregoing amounts to saying that inefficiency is a chief vice
of uniform ambient standards. To leave the matter at that, however,
would leave me looking like a mindless utilitarian, not simply because
I have considered only the "economics" of the matter, but also because even the economic analysis is incomplete. So let me take up
some possible advantages or virtues of uniformity, economic and
otherwise. I put these in terms of (1) matters of administration; (2)
matters of justice; and (3) matters of political rhetoric.9
1. Matters of Administration.-The
argument here-a more
mindful economic argument than the one sketched above-is that
even if uniform standards were otherwise a bad idea, they are redeemed by economies of scale. It is easier and cheaper to establish
and administer a set of uniform standards than it is to establish and
administer a set of varying standards. The difficulty and cost of this
sort of administrative system presumably will go up, perhaps exponentially, as the number of different standards increases.
The premise of this argument is probably correct in some instances, but the argument itself is hardly conclusive. Congress and the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), knowing full
metropolitan areas, it may make economic sense to control a great deal in some places but
little in others."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, EnvironmentalPolicy and FederalStructure: A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1590 (1994) (observing that
the "optimal level of cleanup may vary by location").
8. In fact, federal ambient quality standards tend to be very strict indeed, which is one
reason why most major urban areas in the United States have not been able to meet one or
more of them. See U.S. EwrrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QuALrrv AND EMissIONS

1993, at 83 (1994) [hereinafter EPA REPORT] (tabulating nonattainment
areas for the various ambient air pollutants and indicating, for example, that 93 areas have
not attained the ozone standard, 83 the particulate standard, 47 the sulfur dioxide standard, and 38 the carbon monoxide standard). Only with respect to lead and nitrogen
dioxide is nonattainment a minor problem. Id.
Given this, it is rather off the point to suggest that, because states are free to set ambient standards more demanding than the federal ones, the standards are not in fact really
uniform.
9. For expanded treatment, especially of items (1) and (2), see Krier, supra note 2, at
330-35.
TRENDS REPORT,

1995]

UNIFORM ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS

1231

well that achieving Q in some areas is more difficult than achieving it
in others, already makes regular provision for various kinds of waivers
or delayed timetables-variances-to account for that disparity. In
the face of reality, federal policy-makers have made categorical and
particular exceptions to take account of our imperfect, nonuniform
world."0 But notice what these measures are often called, as least in
common parlance- variances. By definition, they introduce variety,
and for the purpose of saving (not wasting) time and effort. Beyond
this, the variances generally are most influenced by one consideration:
the cost of trying to meet Q too quickly in some areas relative to other
11
areas.
In short, federal policy-makers regularly let differential costs affect ambient requirements for the various states, at least in the short
and medium runs. This means not simply that policy-makers must
consider these departures from uniformity to be worthwhile; it must
also mean that the federal government already has much of the information it thinks it needs to take varying circumstances into account.
But if the government already has the information and already uses it,
then it is hard to understand why nonuniform standards would entail
a wealth of administrative trouble. It seems they do not.
In any event, even if they do entail quite a lot of trouble, this is
hardly conclusive-because the added costs of that trouble (the added costs of varying standards) might nevertheless be more than offset
by the benefits of nonuniformity (the benefits of avoiding undercontrol and overcontrol). The federal government implicitly concedes
this very point in its routine practice of variances. Either that, or the
government is engaging in a practice it does not regard as worthwhile!
2. Matters ofJustice.-The word "costs" has run through the discussion thus far, and no doubt this raises the hackles of many environmentalists, conservationists, and public health advocates. 2 But this is
10. See 3 WILLIAM H.

RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: AIR AND WATER

§ 4.2A, at 16

(Supp. 1994) (discussing EPA's power, under the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water
Act, to develop "case-specific" pollution standards).
11. As a term of art, "variances" usually refers to waivers and the like for particular

pollution sources. See

PERCIVAL ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 906-07. But variation in require-

ments, waivers, and delay in deadlines is the rule, rather than the exception; hence, the

term describes the situation with respect to federal ambient air quality standards, which,
since 1990, have had a diverse set of attainment dates for various categories of areas across
the United States. See id. at 810-14 (discussing the non-attainment problem and the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act).
12. For this reason, perhaps, Congress has nominally insisted that costs be ignored in
setting most environmental standards. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Economic Scene: Cleaning the

Environment Gets Harder,but There are Solutions, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1995, at D2. "Five major
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odd. After all, the word "benefits" bedecks this discussion too, yet the
very same people who usually oppose reference to costs seem not at all
to mind talking about benefits. The irony is that one cannot even
begin to think about benefits in the absence of thinking as well about
costs, except in a world of absolute abundance with respect to everything everyone might ever want. A cost, after all, is but a forgone benefit. The cost of leisure is the forgone wage of working; of working,
the forgone leisure; of polluting, the forgone improvement in the environment; of controlling pollution, the forgone savings of not spending on control devices. The costs of pollution control, passed on to
consumers, employers and employees, stockholders, and taxpayers are
diverted from other worthy objectives. In a world of scarce resources
(our world, like it or not) the cost of every benefit is the value of some
alternative benefit one could have realized instead.
Thus one can think, if one likes (as many environmentalists do),
solely in terms of benefits. To achieve some unit of benefit by protecting health from air pollution, we necessarily have to give up some unit
of benefit that would result were we instead to protect health against
some other threat. Health benefits here mean health costs there.
This hydraulic effect is inescapable. All that can be escaped is waste.
A critic might find injustice in such a state of affairs, but only
because life itself is hard. Justice is not free. (If it were, then, as with
pollution control, we would have all we wanted; we would be sated
with rich justice.) There simply are not, and surely never will be, all
the resources necessary to provide all the justice we would ideally like
to have. So, with respect to justice in particular, waste seems intolerable. Yet this means that if our present uniform standards are (and
clearly many of them are) wasteful and inefficient, then they must be
intolerable as well, for they cost us opportunities to do more and better with the means available.
These observations lead directly into two other, more substantial
concerns about the potential injustice of considering costs. The first
concern is this. To take costs into account we have to be able to calculate them with some accuracy, yet in the case of environmental harms,
in most instances, we cannot. True enough, but notice that it follows
from this that we cannot calculate benefits either, given the discussion

environmental acts, including those setting standards for air, water and toxic waste, actually prohibit regulators from weighing costs against benefits," even though everyone knows
this is a fiction, and that "when the crunch comes, onerous requirements are postponed."
Id. On the fiction, see also Eads, supra note 5, at 229.
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above of the relationship between costs and benefits.13 In fact, we can
only estimate both, and in fact we must. We must also compare the
estimates, at least implicitly, because we have to choose between policiesbetween types of environmental policies, as well as between environmental policies and other types of policies. In the course of making
these choices, some degree of calculation and comparison is unavoidable. The real question is whether the exercise should be conducted
out in the open, or instead sub rosa, on the pretense that calculations
are being ignored. I subscribe to the former approach, and Congress,
it seems, to the latter.1 4
The second substantial concern with costs and justice has to do
with distributional justice, with the idea that a more efficient-here a
less uniform-environmental policy might raise average welfare, but
in a way that most hurts the poor and disadvantaged relative to everybody else. If, for example, some areas end up more polluted than
others, then no doubt the people with the lowest incomes will usually
live in the most polluted areas. 5 This will not always be the case, of
course-consider Los Angeles, or downtown Manhattan, two areas
(one large, one small) where rich and poor alike breathe the same
poor air.' 6 At the other extreme, consider that rural (agricultural)
areas of the country tend to be both poorer' 7 and, in many respects,
purer. 18
Still, it would not be surprising to find as a general pattern that
those with lower incomes end up consuming (can afford) less environmental quality. The difficulty is that they also probably end up bearing a disproportionate (regressive) share of the costs of
environmental cleanup. 9 A related difficulty, then, is the implicit as13. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 1, at 815 (noting that "estimates of both benefits and
costs are uncertain").
14. See supra note 12.

15. See generaly Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neig*borhoods: Disproportionate Siting or MarketDynamics?, 103 YALE L.J., 1383, 1393-97 (1994) (discussing studies that assessed whether locally undesirable land uses are disproportionately located in
poor or minority neighborhoods).
16. See EPA REPORT, supra note 8, at 85-87 (listing "Los Angeles-South Coast Air Basin"

and "New York-New Jersey-Long Island" as ozone nonattainment areas).
17. See MARry STRANGE, RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
11-15 (1991) (noting that farming counties have higher poverty rates than other rural
#
counties, and roughly twice the poverty of metropolitan counties).
18. See EPA REPORT, supra note 8, at 85-87 (listing cities and areas of nonattainment,
showing that major metropolitan areas have more nonattainment problems than rural
areas).
19. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 814-15 (discussing federal estimates of the
extraordinarily high costs of attaining the federal ozone standard in areas-primarily major metropolitan areas-with high ozone levels).
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sumption that people with low incomes prefer more environmental
quality to more jobs, more subsidized health care, more housing allowances, or whatever. At the least, if our present policy of uniform
standards is wasteful, then by definition we would increase the potential welfare of the poor by opting for a more efficient approach that
frees resources for alternative purposes. And if the politics of wealth
redistribution in our society makes transfers of this newfound wealth
to the poor unlikely, then it is equally unlikely that our present policy
of uniformity actually benefits the poor after all, in ways the more
powerful and well-to-do have not yet been smart enough to notice.
There is a relationship between the two concerns just considered
that should be mentioned in closing this brief discussion of costs and
justice. The poor, to the no doubt considerable degree they lack
political power, will have a relative disadvantage in bringing their
views to bear on the slippery politics of calculating costs and benefits.
But it must then be the case that the poor already have a relative disadvantage in shaping environmental policy, along any lines. This suggests little reason to suppose that present policy-including the policy
of uniformity-happens to benefit them. In the end, the redistributional impact of any environmental policy that would ever get on the
table is more or less indeterminate, suggesting that more efficient pollution policies are the prudent course.
3. Matters of PoliticalRhetoric.-No doubt politicians shun open
talk of costs in connection with health and the environment precisely
because they believe that the rhetoric itself would prove costly-to
their political careers. And to ignore costs is, as we saw, to invite uniformity. Something else invites uniformity as well when the topic is, as
here, federal standards imposed on the states. As a point of constitutional principle, if not of constitutional law, and surely as a point of
practical politics, the central government must recognize that the
members of the union stand on equal footing. If they are to be treated
on a differential basis, there must be some compelling reason-ideally
a reason that is consistent with the norm of state equality. Just as it is
politically unwise to talk openly about costs in connection with health
and the environment, so it is worrisome for the members of Congress
to act as though some states should be treated better or worse than
others.2 0
20. For example, federal disaster relief is made available for all the states, despite the
predictably more numerous and more costly disasters of some states.
For an especially whimsical example of the equality norm at work in the air pollution
context, note that for many years federal legislation permitted California, and only Califor-
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The norm of state equality is, therefore, a real constraint on federal policy-making.2 1 Consider, for example, how Richard Stewart resorted to the norm in criticizing a proposal-drafted, as it happens, by
me-to establish nonuniform federal ambient air quality standards set
to vary with the circumstances of given states. Stewart wrote:
Even supposing nonuniform standards are desirable, there
are serious political obstacles to congressional agreement on
nonuniform measures which would permit greater economic
development in some states than others. Members of Congress would also be reluctant to confer on administrative officials discretion to impose nonuniform measures.22
This is an exceedingly strange view. As Stewart is, and was, aware,
Congress had alreadyestablished an air pollution program that "would
permit greater economic development in some states than in others."
Moreover, "administrative officials" (in EPA) already had, and had exercised, "discretion to impose nonuniform measures" regarding air
quality. 23 Indeed, Professor (later, Assistant Attorney General during
the Bush administration) Stewart's generalization about federal uniformity so contradicts what the federal government commonly does in
practice that one has to wonder how such a sober, well-informed, and
intelligent person could possibly have said what he did.

nia, to set more demanding emission standards for new motor vehicles than could other
states. The authority, however, was expressed in terms allowing any state to set such standards provided the state had adopted emission standards prior to March 30, 1966. But as
Congress well knew when it drafted this language in 1967, only California had adopted
such standards. See CURRIE, supra note 6, § 2.40 (discussing federal preemption of state
motor vehicle emission standards).
21. It is also, however, a constraint that can usually be satisfied easily enough, a point I
take up shortly. See infra Part III.B.
22. Richard B. Stewart, History and Policy Analysis, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1159, 1173 (1979)
(reviewingJAMEs E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY (1977)). The proposal
in question can be found at 327-34 in Pollutionand Policy. For the original treatment of the
issue, see Kenneth L. Heitner & James E. Krier, An Approach to Air Quality Management
Standards, 24 AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS'N J. 1039 (1974).
23. Stewart, supra note 22, at 1174 (noting Congress's unwillingness and inability to
enforce clean air deadlines in regions such as Los Angeles). When in 1970 the federal
government set uniform ambient air quality standards for all parts of the country, it necessarily constrained development in some states more than others, because some states had
to clean up more than others. Moreover, under the 1970 legislation, EPA was allowed to
extend limited extensions to states that could not meet the ambient standards by the congressionally established deadlines.' Policy has since moved much further, and more
straightforwardly, in this direction.
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UNIFORM STANDARDS AND FEDERAL STANDARDS

Professor Stewart noted an additional consideration in the course
of his critique. "Leaving standard-setting to state or local authorities
risks inadequate standards," he wrote, "because of interregional competition for economic development. "24 This, obviously, is a very different sort of point, one that relates not to uniform standards but rather
tofederalones. A common but crucial error (not necessarily Stewart's)
is to conflate these two subjects, reasoning as though "federal" necessarily implies "uniform."
It is evident that were states allowed to set their own environmental quality standards, those standards would not be uniform. A few
states, perhaps a number of them, might mimic each other in one
respect or another. This mimicking -would, however, be neither universal nor complete. 25 The "state" standards would be utterly uniform
only if the federal government instructed the states that they could set
any standards they wished so long as those standards were the same as
specified federal standards-but those, of course, would simply be
federal standards, fooling no one.
Why would state standards vary? One reason, an innocent one,
lies in the considerations we mentioned earlier: states differ among
each other in a number of relevant respects. 2 6 Professor Stewart sug-

gested another, more sinister, reason when he mentioned "interregional competition." What he meant is this: Each state would worry
that if it set relatively demanding pollution standards, it would lose
industry to states with more relaxed standards. This in turn would
mean that no state would set any standards more demanding than the
common denominastandards of the state that represented the lowest
27
tor. There would be "a race to the bottom."
This familiar argument is incorrect. It is convincing only in the
presence of externalities-situations where one state can arrange to
transport its own pollution to another state's airshed. Absent an ability
to do that, any state in setting standards would have to make its own
internal tradeoff between the level of economic growth it wanted
24. Id. at 1173.
25. Before 1970, states were free to set their own air quality standards, so long as they
were consistent with uniform federal criteria. Needless to say, different states set different
standards, and some set none at all. See CURRIE, supra note 6, §§ 1.07-1.08 (discussing state
air pollution regulation prior to 1970).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
27. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National EnvironmentalPolicy, 86 YALE L.J., 1196, 1211-12 (1977) (describ-

ing the "Tragedy of the Commons" rationale for centralized environmental regulation).
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within its boundaries and the amount of pollution it would tolerate
within its boundaries. The need to make that tradeoff does not impel
the race to the bottom that worried Stewart, so long as the states differ
among themselves (and they do) in their tastes for prosperity on the
one hand and environmental quality on the other. Externalities are,
therefore, another sinister reason, but now also a good reason, for
federal standard setting.28 There is little evidence, however, that they
are the reason behind our federal quality standards, and, in any event,
externalities do not demand uniform federal standards. 9
Notice that whereas state standard setting necessarily means, in
reality, nonuniformity, federal standard setting does not necessarily
mean uniformity. Certainly in reality it does not; in reality the federal
uniform environmental quality standards have failed (and probably
always will fail) to achieve uniform environmental quality across all
the states. And certainly as a logical proposition federal does not
mean uniform, for the federal government could as well set different
standards for different states. Indeed, as we have seen, in a sense it
already does.3 0
But what then of the norm of equality in a federal system? We are
now positioned to consider that matter with a little more scrutiny than
before.
III.

THE EMPTY IDEA OF UNIFORMITY-AND A TOPOLOGY

A.

An Empty Idea

"Equality," a colleague of mine has demonstrated, is an idea or
ideology that is empty of itself, meaningful only in some particular
comparative context. 3' This is unsurprisingly true of "uniformity" as
well, because uniformity is a kind of equality. When things are equal
to each other they are uniform, otherwise not; equal shares do not
mean more for you than me, they mean a uniform distribution. The
one term means the other.
But what does either mean? The answer is nothing, absent a context. Suppose, for example, that we decide to form a cadre as a part of
which each of us will wear the same distinctive outfit-a "uniform."
28. See id. at 1215-16.
29. See Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-theBottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1213-27
(1992).

30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HAv. L. REV. 537 (1982) (discussing
the confusion derived from the arguably empty concept of equality); PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990) (discussing the varying contextual meanings of equality).
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Does this mean that we are all to wear the same size, even though we
are of different sizes? Uniforms of uniform size would, after all, be
uniform; and they would be (very) distinctive. The problem is that
they would look stupid, and so would we.
One can think of our federal environmental policy in the same
way. We form a cadre-call it a more perfect union-and adopt a
distinctive outfit. Outfitting could mean the same amount of material
for every member (every state), or it could mean something less stupid. If federalism requires, as a matter of principle or politics, the
distinction of uniformity, there remains a question regarding the dimension(s) along which we should measure uniformity. The answer to
that question in the environmental context is not at all obvious, except in one respect. Many environmental standards should not be
uniform in the way they are now, but rather in some other way, along
some other dimension.
There are a host of alternatives, some of them more sensible than
others. Consider.
B.

A Topology

1. Perfectly Efficient Uniformity.-Many economists complain that
uniform environmental standards, whether quality standards or emission and effluent standards, are woefully inefficient because they treat
unlike circumstances in like ways. In other words, they treat the relevant universe as though costs and benefits were the same everywhere
within it, when in fact they are not. The result is that we sometimes
spend more for a unit of benefit than that unit of benefit is worth, and
(contrariwise) we sometimes forgo benefits that would exceed their
costs. Given sufficient information, and on the assumption of easy
administration, we could avoid this waste of uniformity by setting differing federal standards for different areas in different situations.
Nevertheless, we could still have uniformity. In fact, the economists'
dream program would be perfectly uniform (and perfectly efficient)
in that all costs and benefits, everywhere, would be equal at the
margin.
2. Wonderfully Just Uniformity.-As we saw, many people find it
distasteful to think about costs (but, of course, not benefits) in the
context of public health and environmental quality." The contradictions in this kind of thinking were examined earlier; put them aside
for now. Assume-as I did above-that access to information is easy
32. See supra Part I.B.2.
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and administration is cheap. We could then define justice in whatever
way we thought right and adopt the federal program of uniform standards that best fulfilled the aspirations of that definition. Instead of
insisting that justice requires the same environmental quality for everybody everywhere, the federal government could, for example, insist
on standards imposing equal burdens on all the states (as opposed to
the unequal burdens of the present scheme), or, alternatively, standards requiring all the states to improve quality by the same percentage every year. Either of these approaches seems relatively just; none
seems patently unfair.
3. Real World Programs.-The assumptions of easy information
and administration are, of course, unrealistic (though no more so
than the nominally implicit assumption in much of our existing federal environmental policy-that it is easy enough to realize the same
levels of quality everywhere). Every sensible analyst knows that policy
has to be somewhat rough and ready. Because both information and
administration are costly, we have to work with crude estimates of relative costs and benefits, and shape policy in terms of categories that are
far less than perfectly tuned. This hardly means, however, that we
must ignore all tradeoffs (costs and benefits) between alternative approaches, or that we should treat every situation as though it were
identical to all others, when obviously it is not. Instead, we could focus on extremely costly and beneficial approaches, and we could think
of areas that are pretty much the same as each other, or obviously
different from each other. Indeed, our present system of uniformity is
probably so off the mark that just one degree of differentiation-simple enough to accomplish-would entail very significant savings.
4. Tailoring Real World Approaches to the Norm of Equality.-How
can the idea of differentiation among states be squared with the norm
of equality? Easily, once we remember that equality in the abstract is
an empty idea."3 It is empty, I now suggest, precisely because it is so
full.
Consider federal air pollution policy, which since 1970 has approached uniform ambient air quality standards in terms of the following dimensions.' First, there is a concentrationdimension--ozone,
for example, is not to exceed .12 parts per million (ppm.) in the ambient atmosphere.3 5 Second, there is what I shall call a measurement di33. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
34. See EPA
35. Id.

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 19.
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mension. Twelve parts per million of oxidant refers to a maximum
daily average concentration.3 6 Third, there is a time dimension. In
the case of oxidant, for example, the .12 ppm. standard is not to be
exceeded more than one day per year. 3 7 Finally, there is a deadline
dimension, requiring the states to meet the concentration standard in
different years.3 8
Since 1970, all of the foregoing dimensions have been uniform
across the country, with the exception of the deadline dimension,
which has to some degree never been uniform and which most surely
is not uniform now, save for the long run. 9 So is our present policy
uniform, or is it not? The answer is that it is either, as one likes.

IV.

TOWARD A WISE (NOT A FOOLISH) CONSISTENCY

The challenge of shaping environmental (or any other) policy in
a federal system is to honor the norm of state equality in ways that are
wise rather than foolish, fair and efficient rather than wasteful. Our
air pollution policy has moved haltingly in this direction, with much
delay and no doubt considerable unnecessary expense. The policy is
uniform-along, for example, the concentration, measurement, and
time dimensions-but it is variable along the deadline dimension, extending to the year 2010 (which outside date will, I predict, one day
be moved out further for the areas with the biggest attainment
problems). It is also variable in that states are still required to shoulder differential burdens regarding control costs and economic development, even with the differential deadlines.
So is ours a wise or a foolish policy? If it is wise, we can leave it
alone and justify it, in terms of the norm of equality, along any
number of dimensions. If it is foolish-for example, wasteful or unfair in that some states are being unduly strapped, even in the long
run-then it can be amended for the sake of equal burdens, and nevertheless remain uniform (and justifiably so).' Indeed, and this is
true of virtually any federal environmental policy, and probably of
most federal policies of any sort, the norm of equality does not fore-

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 11.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 11 and 23.
40. For example-and this would be a variation on federal air pollution policy since
1990-concentration standards and measurements standards could be set uniformly for all
the states, but the number of days of violation per period, and the deadlines for stages of
improvement, could vary with state circumstances.
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close sensible approaches that might be (roughly) more just and
(roughly) more efficient than what we have now.
It is an empirical question whether the present uniform pattern
of federal environmental policy would be improved-in a scientifically, economically, and politically feasible way-by switching to some
alternative measure or measures of uniformity. Judging from the evidence, however, it is safe to suppose it would. Twenty-five long and
troubled years of experience with federal air pollution legislation suggest that it would have been rather difficult to come up with a worse
program. There have been enormous costs, laughable delays, and extraordinarily differential burdens, all for the sake of someday achieving standards that are, in the extreme cases, probably impossible and
in many instances not worthwhile.4 1 It is for these very reasons that
federal air pollution policy has gradually evolved in the direction of
more sensible differentiation (or, one could also say, more sensible
uniformity). Yet the policy promises to persist in its wasteful ways
come the end of the first decade of the next century. In any event,
and more generally, Congress persists in the view that environmental
quality should eventually be the same everywhere. That is not a commendable objective. It is a foolish consistency at the price of a wiser
one.

41. See supra text accompanying note 19; Air Pollution: New York, NewJersey Ask EPA for
Help ControllingPollution from Outside Area, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1483 (Nov. 25, 1994) (discussing the impossibility of achieving standards in some cases).

